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We present a composable security proof, valid against arbitrary attacks and including finite-size effects, for a
high dimensional time-frequency quantum key distribution (TFQKD) protocol based upon spectrally entangled
photons. Previous works have focused on TFQKD schemes as they combines the impressive loss tolerance of
single-photon QKD with the large alphabets of continuous variable (CV) schemes, which enable the potential
for more than one bit of secret key per transmission. However, the finite-size security of such schemes has
only been proven under the assumption of collective Gaussian attacks. Here, by combining recent advances in
entropic uncertainty relations for CVQKD with decoy state analysis, we derive a composable security proof that
predicts key rates on the order of Mbits/s over metropolitan distances (40km or less) and maximum transmission
distances of up to 140km.
I. INTRODUCTION
Arguably the most promising short term application of
quantum information technology is in the field of cryptog-
raphy, with quantum key distribution (QKD) the canonical
example [1, 2]. In the years since its inception, researchers
have worked to improve the rigour and generality of secu-
rity proofs, design protocols that maximise performance and
bridge the gap between theoretical proposal and experimen-
tal implementation [3, 4]. On the security side, one looks to
derive a security proof that is composably secure against ar-
bitrary eavesdropping attacks whilst including all finite-size
statistical effects [5] (see also [6]). Practically, one searches
for schemes that maximise both the raw clock-rate (the num-
ber of transmissions per second) and the number of secure bits
per transmission to achieve the largest overall secret key rate
at a given transmission distance.
Most photonic QKD implementations fall into one of two
regimes. Traditional discrete variable (DV) schemes encode
the secret key in a two-dimensional Hilbert space such as
the polarisation degrees of freedom of a single photon. Ex-
tending from the original works [1, 2], these protocols now
enjoy universal security proofs [6] that function with rea-
sonably small finite-size data blocks, and converge to the
ideal Devetak-Winter rates for collective attacks [7] in the
asymptotic limit. Continuous variable (CV) schemes utilise
an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, commonly the quadra-
tures of the optical field [8, 9]. Whilst the finite range and
precision of real-life detectors ensures the key is never per-
fectly continuous, CVQKD nevertheless has the capability to
achieve greater than one bit per transmission. Furthermore,
composable, general, finite-size CVQKD security proofs have
also appeared, although the present results either require ex-
tremely large block sizes [10], or are very sensitive to losses
[11, 12] and fail to converge to the Devetak-Winter rates.
This behaviour is in large part due to the different way loss
manifests itself in DV and CV systems. If a single photon
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is sent through an extremely lossy channel, it will only be
detected with very low probability. However, in the instances
where a detection does take place, the quantum state is largely
preserved and the security is unaffected. Therefore, one can in
principle achieve high rates over lossy channels by improving
the repetition rate of the photon source or multiplexing. But
for coherent or squeezed states commonly used in CVQKD,
the loss degrades the signal for all transmissions, rendering the
information advantage so small that even modest experimental
imperfections will eventually prohibit key extraction.
An alternative approach is to encode the key in the con-
tinuous degrees of freedom of single photons, inheriting both
the loss tolerance of DVQKD and the larger encoding space
of CV protocols [13]. These time-frequency schemes are pri-
marily pursued via the temporal and spectral correlations of
single photons emitted during spontaneous parametric down
conversion (SPDC) and the security stems from the conjugate
nature of frequency and arrival time measurements. One can
use fast time-resolving detectors to directly measure photon
arrival times and a grating spectrometer to measure frequency.
It is also possible to adopt just the former detection scheme
and convert to frequency measurements via dispersive optics
[14], or the solely the latter and convert to time via phase mod-
ulation [15]. Significant progress has been made on the theo-
retical [16] and experimental front [17, 18] however, a general
composable security proof is lacking. Exploiting techniques
from traditional CVQKD [19–21], security proofs have been
derived against Gaussian collective attacks and extended to
incorporate finite-size effects [22] and decoy-states [23] cul-
minating in a result including both [24].
In this work we present a finite-size, composably secure
proof for TFQKD by combining the entropic uncertainty
proofs for CVQKD [11] with efficient, finite-size decoy-state
analysis [25, 26] for DVQKD. The resultant proofs allow for
high rates of key to be distributed over urban and inter-city
distances with reasonable block sizes.
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2II. SECURITY PROOF I
A. Generic protocol
A fairly generic TFQKD decoy-state protocol can be sum-
marised as follows.
1. Quantum transmission and measurement: Quantum
states are distributed from Alice to Bob through a po-
tentially eavesdropper controlled quantum channel. In
particular, using a pulsed SPDC source she prepares
time-frequency entangled photons. Each round of trans-
mission is defined by a time frame of length Tf which
is centred about the peak of each pump pulse. Alice
randomly varies her pump power between three values
µ1, µ2, µ3, according to probabilities {pµ1 , pµ2 , pµ3 =
1−pµ1−pµ2}. Immediately after the channel, we make
the worst case assumption which is that Eve completely
purifies the shared state, ρAB , such that the overall tri-
partite state, |ABE〉, is pure. Alice and Bob then ran-
domly switch between measuring the frequency or ar-
rival time of the photons. They choose either the time or
frequency measurement for key generation and use the
other to check for an eavesdroppers presence. To anal-
yse both possibilities, we will write the two incompat-
ible observables as positive operator valued measure-
ments (POVMs) (XA,PA) for Alice and (XB,PB) for
Bob. Here we will always denote X as the key generat-
ing observable and P as the check.
2. Parameter Estimation: Alice and Bob first announce
their measurement choices in each round over a
public, but authenticated, classical channel and dis-
card all instances where they differ, as well as
any instances where two or more detections occur
in the same frame. This results in raw, corre-
lated variables (XA, XB) which take values xA =
[x1A, x
2
A...x
nX
A ], xB = [x
1
B , x
2
B ...x
nP
B ] which are strings
of length nX−, distributed according to a probability
distribution pxA,xB = Pr(XA = xA, XB = xB) and
similarly for PA and PB . Throughout, we will use up-
percase to denote random variables and lowercase to
denote a corresponding string that is an instantiation of
that variable. Alice then announces which intensity was
used in each transmission and the results are further par-
titioned into substrings e.g. xA is partitioned into xA,µk
of length nX,µk for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and similarly for the
other strings. Using the number of detections for each
pump power and decoy state analysis, Alice and Bob
lower bound the number of signals that originated from
a single photon transmission. They then announce all
outcomes for the P observables and evaluate the qual-
ity of their correlations. If the quality is sufficiently
high (in a way we will make precise later) they pro-
ceed, otherwise they abort. Call the passing probability
ppass. Conditional on passing, they are left with raw
keys which are partially correlated between Alice and
Bob as well as the eavesdropper. The overall condi-
tional state between Alice, Bob and Eve is a classical-
quantum state of the form,
ρXAXBE =
∑
xA,xB
pxA,xB |xA, xB〉 〈xB , xA| ⊗ ρxA,xBE (1)
3. Reconciliation: Either Alice or Bob is designated the
reference partner, which means that their string is desig-
nated as the ‘correct’ string. The reference partner then
sends information to the other party to correct any er-
rors between the two strings. If the reference partner is
Alice, and the reconciliation information flows in same
direction as the quantum transmission this is called di-
rect reconciliation (DR). The converse is called reverse
reconciliation (RR). Here we will consider the DR case.
If the reconciliation is successful, Alice and Bob will
now have perfectly correlated strings xB = xA which
are still partially known to Eve. In fact, Eve will usu-
ally have learned some more information about the
strings during the reconciliation process. The amount
of ‘leaked’ information is denoted lEC. There is also an
additional loss from a reconciliation check procedure,
where Alice announces a further string of size log(1/c)
to ensure the strings are identical except with probabil-
ity c.
4. Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob now apply a
function, f , drawn randomly from a family, F , of
two-universal hashing functions to their measurement
strings giving {f(xA), f(xB)} = {sA, sB}. The final
state is now
ρSASBE =
∑
sA,sB
psA,sB |sA, sB〉 〈sB , sA| ⊗ ρSA,SBE (2)
This ideally result in strings of length l which are per-
fectly correlated, uniformly random, and completely in-
dependent of Eve. These are the final secret keys. The
goal of a security analysis is to find a lower bound on
the number of extractable bits, l, for any given protocol.
B. Composable security
We now formally state the definitions of composable secu-
rity and a formalism to quantitatively relax from the ideal case
[5, 6].
Definition 1 A protocol that outputs a state of the form (2) is
• c-correct if Pr[SA 6= SB ] ≤ c and correct if the con-
dition holds for c = 0.
• s-secret if
ppass
1
2
||ρSAE − τSA ⊗ σE || ≤ s (3)
where ρSAE = trB(ρSASBE), || · || is the trace norm
and τSA is the uniform (i.e. maximally mixed) state over
SA. It is secret if the condition holds for s = 0.
3The protocol is ideal if is is both correct and secret and sec-
secure if it is sec-indistinguishable from an ideal protocol.
This means that there is no device or procedure that can dis-
tinguish between the actual protocol and an ideal protocol
with probability higher than sec. If the protocol is s-secret
and c-correct then it is sec-secure for any sec > c + s.
The choice of error reconciliation fixes c so the goal is now
to find a method to bound s. First, we briefly introduce the
entropic quantities appropriate for finite-size analysis. For a
random variable X coupled to a quantum system E associ-
ated with a Hilbert space HE with the joint system described
by a classical-quantum state ρXE =
∑
x px |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxE , the
conditional min-entropy of X can be defined as the negative
logarithm of the optimal probability of successfully guessing
X given E [27], that is,
Hmin(X|E)ρXE = − log
(
sup
{Ex}
∑
x
pxtr (Exρ
x
E)
)
(4)
where the supremum is taken over all POVMs and the log-
arithm here and throughout is taken to be base 2. A related
quantity is the conditional max-entropy
Hmax(X|E)ρXE = 2 log
(
sup
σE
∑
x
F (pXρ
x
E , σE)
)
(5)
where F (ρ, σ) = tr
(|√ρ√σ|) is the quantum fidelity and the
supremum is over all physical states in HE , that is S(HE) =
{σE ∈ HE |σE ≥ 0, tr(σE) = 1}. One can also define
smoothed versions of these quantities that consider -regions
in the state space. Concretely we have,
Hmin(X|E)ρXE = sup
ρ˜XE
Hmin(X|E)ρ˜XE
Hmax(X|E)ρXE = inf
ρ˜XE
Hmax(X|E)ρ˜XE (6)
where the supremum and infimum are taken over all states
ρ˜XE that are -close in the purified distance, defined as
P(ρ, σ) = √1− F 2(ρ, σ). We again emphasise that
throughout this work we will be considering the classical-
quantum states conditioned on the parameter estimation test
having been passed. For the rest of this work we will suppress
the state subscript in the entropies.
If the guessing probability is low then the variable X must
have a high degree of randomness with respect to an observer
holding E. Intuitively then, we might expect the conditional
smooth min-entropy to be related to the number of secret bits
extractable from variable X with failure probability  as de-
scribed in Definition 1. This intuition is usefully formalised
in the Leftover Hash Lemma (with quantum side information)
[28, 29].
Lemma 1 Let ρXAXBE be a state of the form (1) whereXA is
defined over a a discrete-valued and finite alphabet, E is a fi-
nite or infinite dimensional system andR is a register contain-
ing the classical information learnt by Eve during information
reconciliation. If Alice applies a hashing function, drawn at
random from a family of two-universal hash functions [41]
that maps XA to SA and generates a string of length l , then
1
2
||ρSAE − τSA ⊗ σE || ≤
√
2l−Hmin(XA|ER)−2 + 2 (7)
where Hmin(XA|ER) is the conditional smooth min-entropy
of the raw measurement data given Eve’s quantum system and
the information reconciliation leakage.
Comparing (3) and (7) we see that with an appropriate choice
of l we can ensure the security condition is met. In particular
we see that the smooth min-entropy is a lower bound on the
extractable key length. Suppose that we are only able to bound
the smooth min-entropy with a certain probability 1− fail (in
this work this will be due to the use of Hoeffding’s bound
in the decoy-state analysis). To get a more exact expression
notice that if we choose
l = Hmin(XA|ER) + 2− 2 log
ppass
1
(8)
for some 1 > 0 then the r.h.s of (7) is 1/ppass + 2. Then,
provided
 ≤ 
′
s − 1
2ppass
(9)
the convexity and boundedness of the trace distance im-
plies we will satisfy (3) for any secrecy parameter s ≥
′s + fail. Recalling that by assumption Eve learns at most
lEC + log 1/c bits during information reconciliation we have
that,
Hmin(XA|ER) ≥ Hmin(XA|E)− lEC − log
1
c
(10)
Finally since log(ppass) < 0 we have the following result [6,
11]
Theorem 1 Let ρXAE describe the state between Alice and
Eve conditioned on the parameter estimation test succeeding
such that the Leftover Hash lemma is applicable. For an er-
ror correction scheme as defined above we may extract an c-
correct and s-secret key of length
l ≥ Hmin(XA|E)− lEC − log
1
c21
+ 2 (11)
So the problem has essentially condensed to bounding the
conditional smooth min-entropy, Hmin(XA|E). The cen-
tral idea is to quantify the smooth min-entropy in one ob-
servable by observing the statistics of another, incompati-
ble, observable. This is nothing more than a manifestation
of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which has long under-
pinned quantum cryptographic protocols. Specifically, this
notion is quantitatively expressed via an uncertainty relation
for the smooth min- and max-entropies [30] and its extension
to the infinite dimensional setting in [29, 31]. These relations
can be formulated as follows [11, 32]. Let ρABC be an nX -
mode state shared between Alice, Bob and Charlie and let Al-
4ice’s measurements be described by POVMs XA and PA with
elements {Ei} and {Fj} respectively. Let XA be the ran-
dom variable describing the measurement outcome and ρXAC
be the joint state of the measurement register and system C
given that Alice measured XA on each of the nX modes. Fur-
ther, let PA describe the measurement outcome and ρPAB be
the joint state of the measurement register and systemB given
the counterfactual scenario where Alice instead measured PA
upon each mode. The sum of the corresponding smooth en-
tropies satisfies the relation
Hmin(XA|C) +Hmax(PA|B) ≥ −nX log c (12)
where c = maxi,j ||
√
Ei
√
Fj ||∞ quantifies the compatibility
of the measurements with || · ||∞ the operator norm or the
largest singular value.
We now turn to our specific measurement setup where we
identify the conjugate measurementsXA and PA with time and
frequency.
C. Time-frequency measurement uncertainty relation
Following [16, 33] we describe the arrival time and conju-
gate frequency detuning measurements by the following oper-
ators,
tˆJ =
∫
dt tJ Eˆ
†(t)J Eˆ(t)J
ωˆJ =
∫
dω
2pi
ωJ Aˆ
†(ω)J Aˆ(ω)J (13)
for J ∈ {A,B}. If we restrict the field operators to the
Hilbert space spanned by the single photon time or frequency
domain states, {|tJ〉 : −∞ < t < ∞} and {|ωJ〉 : −∞ <
ω < ∞}, then we have EˆJ(t) = |0J〉 〈tJ | and AˆJ(ω) =
|0J〉 〈ωJ | so that we can write,
tˆJ =
∫
dt t |tJ〉 〈tJ |
ωˆJ =
∫
dω
2pi
ω |ωJ〉 〈ωJ | (14)
These operators can be shown to be maximally complemen-
tary, self-adjoint projectors describing an arrival time mea-
surement that satisfy
[
tˆJ , ωˆK
]
= iδJK , and hence can be
considered equivalent to the canonical position and momen-
tum operators [33].
Fortunately, the smooth-min entropy uncertainty relations
have recently been extended to allow for observables and
eavesdroppers living in infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces
[11, 31, 34]. However, only in the instances where Alice’s
source emitted exactly one photon will the POVM’s be re-
stricted as per (14) and result in a useful uncertainty relation.
To this end, let XA,1 be a POVM, defined as the restriction of
the POVMXA to the single photon subspace such that it is de-
scribed as per (14). We can now consider the decomposition
of the measurement record into variables describing the sin-
gle, vacuum and multi-photon components components such
that we have Hmin(XA|E) = Hmin(XA,1XA,0XA,m|E).
In order to apply the uncertainty relation directly we con-
sider the case where Eve assumed to know the multi-photon
and vacuum measurements and is left solely with estimat-
ing the single photon components, that is we set C =
XA,0XA,mE in (12). The following section explains how to
relateHmin(XA|XA,0XA,mE) toHmin(XA|E) and also how
to estimate the number of single photon events in a given set
of detections. Even though Alice never knows in a given run
how many photons are emitted, the number of single-photon
events in a collection of runs can be bounded via decoy-state
analysis which involves using states with known average pho-
ton numbers. For now we turn to computing the overlap for
measurements described by (14).
In fact, Alice and Bob actually measure coarse grained, fi-
nite versions of these measurements. This is a practical neces-
sity in ordinary CVQKD (all homodyne measurements have a
finite precision and dynamic range) and in this case, measur-
ing precisely an arrival time operator as defined in (14) would
require a detector that has been turned on in the infinite past.
Furthermore, a finite alphabet is necessary in order to apply
the leftover hash lemma. In standard CVQKD the quadra-
ture observables can usually be treated symmetrically. In this
work we must consider the conjugate observables individu-
ally, partly because in practice they have different achievable
measurement resolutions and partly because they are physi-
cally different quantities. For instance, for arrival time mea-
surements the maximum value is equal to the time frame dura-
tion for each measurement round, which in turn puts immedi-
ate limits on the maximum overall clock rate of the protocol.
Alice’s measurements are divided into evenly spaced bins
of width δX , δP up to a maximum value ±∆X ,±∆P such
that MX = 2∆X/δX + 1,MP = 2∆P /δP + 1 are assumed
integer alphabet sizes for simplicity. We can write binned
observables corresponding to intervals on the real line I1 =
(−∞,−∆X +δX ], I2 = (−∆X +δX ,−∆X +2δX ]...IMX =
(∆X − δX ,∞]. The measurement outcome range is then de-
noted X = {1, 2, ...,MX} ⊂ Z. Thus the POVM elements of
XA,1 are projectors in (14) integrated over the bin intervals,
Ei =
∫
Ii
kA |kA〉 〈kA| dkA, kA ∈ {tA, ωA} (15)
and similarly for PA,1 = {Fj}. Notice that this is some-
thing of a problem as the two infinite end intervals of these
binned measurements actually have a large overlap. In fact
||√E1
√
F1|| ≈ 1 which would mean that for these particular
measurements the RHS of (12) is approximately zero and the
relationship becomes useless.
To avoid this problem, instead consider a second, hypothet-
ical set of discrete measurements (X˜A,1, P˜A,1) which are de-
fined as per (15) but over a new interval set which is simply
the infinite collection of intervals, {I˜i}i∈Z, of width δ, enu-
merated such that I˜j = Ij ∀ k ∈ X . For these measurements
the maximum overlap is given by [11],
5c(δX , δP ) =
δXδP
2pi
S
(1)
0
(
1,
δXδP
4
)
(16)
where S(1)0 (·, u) is the radial prolate spheroidal wavefunction
of the first kind. Thus, for sufficiently small bin sizes, we can
always recover a nontrivial value of c and thus a useful uncer-
tainty relation. The idea is that, for a state that mostly lives
in the phase space spanned by the region [−∆X ,∆X ], the
classical-quantum states after Alice applies X˜A,1 and XA,1
will be very close. We will use our knowledge of Alice’s
state preparation to quantify this ‘closeness’. In particular,
we will assume that for the all states used in the protocol Al-
ice’s source produces a tensor product state, and in particular
for the nX states on which XA is measured there is some σAB
such that ρAB = (σAB)⊗nX . Moreover, our knowledge of
Alice’s state allows us to lower bound the probability of mea-
suring a value within the range [−∆X ,∆X ] on any given run
such that, ∫ ∆X
−∆X
tr (σAB |kA〉 〈kA|) dkA ≥ p∆X (17)
This it turn means that the probability of measuring an ab-
solute value larger than ∆X at any point in the whole proto-
col given the parameter test was passed is g(p∆X , nX)/ppass
where,
g(p∆X , nX) ≤ 1− pnX∆X (18)
and a similar relation holds for the PA measurements.
We then finally have a relation between the entropies of
the two discretized measurements conditional on a system C,
namely [11]
Hmin(XA,1|C) > H−
′
min (X˜A,1|C)
−Hmax(PA,1|C) > −H−
′′
max (P˜A,1|C) (19)
where
′ =
√
2g(p∆X , nX)
ppass
, ′′ =
√
2g(p∆P , nX)
ppass
(20)
(recall that the scripted variable PA is denoting the hypothet-
ical situation where PA was measured on the nX key gener-
ating modes instead). Putting all this together with the uncer-
tainty relation (12) finally allows us to write,
Hmin(XA,1|XA,0XA,mE) ≥ nX,1 log2
1
c(δX , δP )
− H−′−′′max (PA,1|B) (21)
where nX,1 is the number of instances where Alice and Bob
measured in the same basis and only a single photon was cre-
ated. In reality however, the measurement record will also
include contributions from vacuum and multi-photon terms
so we will need a way to determine a lower bound on the
min-entropy of the whole string, Hmin(XA|E) in terms of
Hmin(XA,1|E) so that we can apply (21). We will also
require a lower bound on nX,1 and an upper bound upon
H−
′−′′
max (PA,1|B) based upon the correlations in the nP
measurements of P observables. Fortunately, all of these can
be achieved via decoy-state analysis.
D. Decoy state analysis
We employ the decoy-state analysis of [26] which we
will recapitulate in our notation for completeness. Recall-
ing the decomposition of the measurements into vacuum, sin-
gle and multi-photon components we have Hmin(XA|E) =
Hmin(XA,1XA,0XA,m|E). Applying a generalisation of the
chain rule for smooth-entropies [35] gives,
Hmin(XA|E) > Hα1min(XA,1|XA,0XA,mE)
+ Hα3+2α4+α5min (XA,0XA,m|E)
− 2 log2
1
α2
− 1
for  = 2α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 + α5 where αi > 0 for all i.
Applying the same chain rule to the second term on the rhs
gives,
Hα3+2α4+α5min (XA,0XA,m|E) > Hα4min(XA,m|E)
+ Hα5min(XA,0|E)
− 2 log2
1
α3
− 1
≥ nX,0 log2MX
− 2 log2
1
α3
− 1
where nX,0 is the number of X basis measurements that re-
sulted when the source produced a vacuum state. In the
second inequality we have used that Hα4min(XA,m|E) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to assuming all multi-photon events are
insecure and also that Hα5min(XA,0|E) ≥ Hmin(XA,0|E) =
Hmin(XA,0) = nX,0 log2MX where the inequality is true by
definition and final equality comes from assuming that vac-
uum contributions are uncorrelated with the chosen bit val-
ues and uniformly distributed across the measurement range.
Note that since α4 and α5 now no longer feature directly, we
can set them arbitrarily small and neglect them from further
calculations. Putting this together gives,
Hmin(XA|E) ≥ Hα1min(XA,1|XA,0XA,mE) + nX,0 log2MX
− log2
1
α23α
2
2
− 2 (22)
6which we can now bound according to (21) to get
Hmin(XA|E) ≥ nX,1 log2
1
c(δX , δP )
− Hα1−′−′′max (PA,1|B) + nX,0 log2MX
− log2
1
α23α
2
2
− 2 (23)
Now, we also need to derive lower bounds upon the num-
ber of vacuum and single photon contributions. Recall that
in the protocol, Alice probabilistically selects a pump power,
µk, with probability pk which in turn probabilistically results
in an n-photon state with conditional probability
pn|µk =
e−µkµnk
n!
(24)
assuming a Poissonian source. Although we cannot directly
know how many detections are due to a particular photon
number emission, we do know how many detections are due to
a particular pump power. The main idea of a decoy state anal-
ysis is to use the latter information to place bounds on the for-
mer. Following [25, 26] we first note from the eavesdropper’s
perspective it could just as well be a counterfactual scenario
where Alice instead creates n-photon states and merely prob-
abilistically partitions them so that each subset has a mean
photon number µk. Indeed, Bayes’ rule allows us to write
the down the appropriate probability of pump power given n-
photon emission as,
pµk|n =
pµkpn|µk
τn
(25)
where
τn =
∑
k
pµk
e−µkµnk
n!
(26)
is the total probability of an n-photon emission. Note that
technically all of these probabilities should also be condi-
tioned on the parameter test on the PA basis measurements
passing. However, when considering the XA basis Alice can
be sure that this conditioning will make no difference. To see
this, consider the counterfactual case where she prepares n-
photon states. By simply not assigning µ values in the XA
basis until after the parameter test on the PA is completed
she can ensure that probabilities like (25) are unchanged by
conditioning. In the asymptotic limit of large statistics, (25)
allows us to relate the number of coincidences given a certain
pump power, nX,µk to the number given an n-photon emis-
sion, nX,n, via
n∗X,µk =
∞∑
n=0
pµk|nnX,n
=
∞∑
n=0
pµke
−µkµnk
τnn!
nX,n (27)
where n∗X,µ is the asymptotic value of nX,µk and we have sub-
stituted in from (25) and (24). We can then use Hoeffding’s
inequality for independent events which says that the differ-
ence between observed statistics and their asymptotic values
is bounded by
|n∗X,µk − nX,µk | ≤ λ(nX , 2) (28)
and hence n−X,µk ≤ n∗X,µk ≤ n+X,µk where,
n±X,µk := nX,µk ± λ(nX , 2) (29)
with probability at least 1 − 22 where λ(nX , 2) =√
nX
2 ln
1
2
. Now consider the following expression:
µ2e
µ3n∗X,µ3
pµ3
− µ3e
µ2n∗X,µ2
pµ2
=
∞∑
n=0
(
µ2e
µ3pµ3e
−µ3µn3nX,n
n!τnpµ3
− µ3e
µ2pµ2e
−µ2µn2nX,n
n!τnpµ2
)
= µ2µ3
∞∑
n=0
(µn−13 − µn−12 )nX,n
τnn!
Notice that in the above expression the summand vanishes
when n = 1. This means we can split up the sum as,
µ2e
µ3n∗X,µ3
pµ3
− µ3e
µ2n∗X,µ2
pµ2
=
(µ2 − µ3)nX,0
τ0
− µ2µ3
∞∑
n=2
(µn−12 − µn−13 )nX,n
τnn!
≤ (µ2 − µ3)nX,0
τ0
(30)
where the inequality holds provided µ2 > µ3. Rearranging
gives a lower bound on the vacuum conincidences,
nX,0 ≥ n−X,0 := τ0
eµ3µ2n
−
X,µ3
− eµ2µ3n+X,µ2
pµ3pµ2(µ2 − µ3)
(31)
which holds with probability at least 1− 42.
The single photon bound is somewhat more involved. First,
by similar reasoning as above, we have:
eµ2n∗X,µ2
pµ2
− e
µ3n∗X,µ3
pµ3
=
∞∑
n=0
(µn2 − µn3 )nX,n
τnn!
=
(µ2 − µ3)nX,1
τ1
+
∞∑
n=2
(µn2 − µn3 )nX,n
τnn!
(32)
since now the n = 0 term vanishes. Now, using the identity
7an − bn = (a− b)∑n−1i=0 an−1−ibi we have
µn2 − µn3 = (µ2 − µ3)
n−1∑
i=0
µn−1−i2 µ
i
3 (33)
which combined with the inequality
∑n−1
i=0 µ
n−1−i
2 µ
i
3 ≤
(µ2 + µ3)
n−1 ∀n ≥ 2 gives
µn2 − µn3 ≤ (µ2 − µ3)(µ2 + µ3)n−1
=
µ2 − µ3
µ2 + µ3
(µ2 + µ3)
n
=
µ22 − µ23
(µ2 + µ3)2
(µ2 + µ3)
n
≤ µ
2
2 − µ23
µ21
µn1 (34)
where the second last equality results in a tighter bound when
we apply the condition µ1 > µ2 + µ3 to obtain the last in-
equality. Substituting back in (32) yields:
eµ2n∗X,µ2
pµ2
− e
µ3n∗X,µ3
pµ3
≤ (µ2 − µ3)nX,1
τ1
+
µ22 − µ23
µ21
∞∑
n=2
µn1nX,n
τnn!
(35)
Rewriting the sum as
∞∑
n=2
µn1nX,n
τnn!
=
∞∑
n=0
µn1nX,n
τnn!
− nX,0
τ0
− µ1nX,1
τ1
=
eµ1
pµ1
n∗X,µ1 −
nX,0
τ0
− µ1nX,1
τ1
(36)
and substituting back into (35), we can solve for nX,1, and us-
ing the Hoeffding bounds arrive at the following lower bound
for the single photon detections:
nX,1 ≥ n−X,1 :=
µ1τ1
µ1(µ2 − µ3)− (µ22 − µ23)
[
eµ2
pµ2
n−X,µ2
− e
µ3
pµ3
n+X,µ3 +
µ22 − µ23
µ21
(
n−X,0
τ0
− e
µ1
pµ1
n+X,µ1
)]
(37)
which holds with probability at least 1− 62.
Now the only unbounded term in the key rate formula is
the max-entropy term Hα1−
′−′′
max (PA,1|B). Firstly, by the
data processing inequality we have Hα1−
′−′′
max (PA,1|B) ≤
Hα1−
′−′′
max (PA,1|PB,1). We again use the results of [11],
where a statistical bound on the smooth max-entropy over
a classical probability distribution is found based on the ob-
served correlations. Alice and Bob quantify the correlations
by computing the average distance (essentially the Hamming
distance but for non-binary strings) which for two strings pA
and pB taking values in R is defined as:
d(pA, pB) :=
1
nP
nP∑
i=1
|piA − piB | :=
mP
nP
(38)
In order to boundHα1−
′−′′
max (PA,1|PB,1) we proceed in three
steps. Firstly, we use decoy-state arguments to upper bound
d(pA,1, pB,1), the average distance on just the single pho-
ton terms. Then, following [11], we use this upper bound
and a result by Serfling [36] to upper bound the average dis-
tance that could be observed on the counterfactual variables
d(PA,1,PB,1). Finally, we use this quantity to upper bound
the smooth max-entropy.
The quantity mP in (38) is just counting the number of
bins between Alice and Bob’s measurements. Considering the
substring corresponding to pump power µ1, in the asymptotic
limit, we expect m∗P,µ1 from mP errors to be assigned to µ1
where
m∗P,µ1 =
∞∑
n=0
pµ1|nmP,n (39)
and mP,n is the number of errors in the P basis resulting from
n-photon states. Just as when we were bounding the num-
ber of single-photon terms, we can use Hoeffding’s result to
bound the difference between this unknown asymptotic quan-
tity and the observed value,
m∗P,µ1 ≤ m+P,µ1 = mP,µ1 + λ′(1, nP ,MP ) (40)
except with probability 1− 22 where now λ′(2, nP ,MP ) =√
mPM2P
2 ln
1
2
to account for the non-binary nature of entries
in the error strings. Hence we expect in the asymptotic limit
to have
m∗P,µk =
∞∑
n=0
pµk|nmP,n ≥ pµk|1mP,1
= pµk|1nP,1d(pA,1, pB,1) (41)
Rearranging gives,
d(pA,1, pB,1) ≤
m∗P,µk
pµk|1nP,1
≤ m
+
P,µk
pµk|1n
−
P,1
:= d+P,1 (42)
with probability at least 1− 42 where n−P,1 is calculated in
the same manner as (37). Now, say that Alice and Bob abort
the protocol whenever d+P,1 > d0.
Now, we again consider bounding the counterfactual av-
erage distance d(PA,1,PB,1). For brevity we define dP,1 =
d(PA,1,PB,1) and dP,1 = d(pA,1, pB,1) and denote the total
average distance that would be observed on the combination
of the strings as dP,tot. Given that the observed correlations
8pass the parameter estimation test, we are interested in the
probability that the average distance of the hypothetical mea-
surements would be greater than dP,1 by a fixed amount.
Pr[dP,1 > d
+
P,1 + C|“pass”] ≤ Pr[dP,1 > dP,1 + C|“pass”]
≤ Pr[dP,1 > dP,1 + C]
ppass
(43)
where we have used Bayes’ theorem in the last line.
Bounding Pr[dP,1 > dP,1 + C] is a standard problem of
random sampling without replacement. Defining the total
number of detections coming from single photons as N1 =
nX,1 + nP,1 we have,
N1dP,tot = nX,1dP,1 + nP,1dP,1 (44)
A result by Serfling shows that for any a [36],
Pr[dP,1 > a+ C|dP,tot = a] ≤ exp
( −2nX,1N1C2
(nP,1 + 1)M2P
)
(45)
where we recall that MP is the size of the alphabet of PA
outcomes. Now using (44) and (45) we can write,
Pr[dP,1 > dP,1 + C] = Pr[dP,1 > dP,tot +
nP,1
N1
C]
=
∑
a
Pr[dP,tot = a]Pr[dP,1 > a+
nP,1
N1
C|dP,tot = a]
≤ exp
(−2nX,1(nP,1)2C2
(nP,1 + 1)N1M2P
)
(46)
Substituting back into (43) and recalling that the protocol
aborts whenever d+P,1 > d0 we have,
Pr[dP,1 > d0 + C|“pass”] ≤
exp
(
−2n−X,1(n−P,1)2C2
(n+P,1+1)N
+
1 M
2
P
)
ppass
(47)
where we have substituted in the lower bounds in the numera-
tor and upper bounds in the denominator. In order to evaluate
(47) we still require the upper bound N+1 , noting that this will
automatically yield n+P,1 = N
+
1 − n−X,1. To this end, define
nµk as the total number of detections in both bases at a given
pump power, n∗µk as its asymptotic value and Nn as the num-
ber of detections from n-photon states. Then we may write,
eµ2n∗µ2
pµ2
− e
µ3n∗µ3
pµ3
=
∞∑
n=0
(µn2 − µn3 )Nn
τnn!
=
(µ2 − µ3)N1
τ1
+
∞∑
n=2
(µn2 − µn3 )Nn
τnn!
≥ (µ2 − µ3)N1
τ1
(48)
provided µ2 > µ3 which implies
N1 ≤ N+1 :=
τ1
µ2 − µ3
(
eµ2n+µ2
pµ2
− e
µ3n−µ3
pµ3
)
(49)
except with probability 1− 42. Finally, we use the following
result [11] (Proposition 1),
Lemma 2 Let P be a finite alphabet, Q(p, p′) a probability
distribution on Pn × Pn for some n ∈ N, κ > 0 and ν > 0.
If PrQ[d(p, p′) ≥ κ] ≤ ν2 then,
Hνmax(P |P ′) < n log γ(κ) (50)
where
γ(x) = (x+
√
1 + x2)
(
x√
1 + x2 − 1
)x
(51)
This result might seem surprising given that an entropy is by
definition label-independent, whereas the average distance ex-
plicitly depends upon the choice of labels. The resolution is
that the lemma is derived by taking a worse case scenario in
which the number of observed bin errors is assumed to be due
to individual entries each of which different by only one bin,
thus maximising the max-entropy. This means that the bound
will hold true regardless of the labelling convention used on
the data, but a poor choice of labelling (for instance one that
numbered adjacent bins by greatly differing numbers) would
result in a very pessimistic bound. We can apply this result by
setting ν2 = exp
(
−2n−X,1(n−P,1)2C2
(n+P,1+1)N
+
1 M
2
P
)
/ppass. This allows us
to bound
Hνmax(PA,1|PB,1) ≤ log2 γ(d0 + C) (52)
where
C = MP
√√√√N+1 (n+P,1 + 1)
n−X,1(n
−
P,1)
2
×
√
ln
1√
ppassν
(53)
for any ppass which is always possible provided ν > 0. Thus,
provided α1 − ′ − ′′ > 0 there is some C such that we can
set ν = α1 − ′ − ′′ and use this result to bound the smooth
max-entropy in (23).
The final step is to account for all the error terms due to
finite-size effects to find the actual secrecy parameter and to
eliminate the explicit dependence upon ppass. From the decoy
state analysis we can rewrite α1 = ( − α2 − α3)/2 (recall
that we can neglect the α4 and α5 terms). From our secu-
rity definitions, provided (9) is satisfied, we will extract an
s = 
′
s + fail secret key. In particular we may satisfy (9) by
9choosing  = 
′
s−1
2
√
ppass
in which case we have,
√
ppassν =
1
2
(
′s − 1
2
−√ppass(α2 + α3)
)
−
√
(2g(p∆X , nX))−
√
(2g(p∆P , nX))
≥ 1
2
(
′s − 1
2
− (α2 + α3)
)
−
√
(2g(p∆X , nX))−
√
(2g(p∆P , nX))
=
1
2
(
s − fail − 1
2
− (α2 + α3)
)
−
√
(2g(p∆X , nX))−
√
(2g(p∆P , nX)) (54)
where the second line used ppass ≤ 1. This lower bound on ν
can be used to upper bound on the logarithmic term in (53).
We must include the failure probabilities from the Hoeffd-
ing bounds, which we applied to the number of counts for
three pump powers in two measurement bases, each contribut-
ing an error term 22. This gives an overall error budget fail =
122. If, for simplicity, we choose 2 = α2 = α3 := 1 and
set 1 = s/21 then straightforward substitution into (54),
which is used to bound (53) and hence (52)and (23) gives us
a final expression for the c-correct, s-secret key length:
l ≥ −n−X,1 log2 c(δX , δP )− n−X,1 log2 γ(d0 + C ′)
− 4 log2
21
s
+ nX,0 log2MX − lEC − log2
1
cs
(55)
where
C ′ = MP
√√√√N+1 (n+P,1 + 1)
n−X,1(n
−
P,1)
2
×
√
ln
1
s/21−
√
(2g(p∆X , nX))−
√
(2g(p∆P , nX))
As noted earlier, in order for there to be a positive keyrate, the
denominator inside the logarithmic term in C must positive.
This means that ∆X ,∆P are not free parameters, but must be
chosen to ensure that this condition is satisfied.
III. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
We now turn to the the numerical evaluation of the key
rate formula, taking parameters mostly from [17, 18] for the
simulations. We will consider transmission through optical
fibre at telecom wavelengths, which is well modelled as a
lossy channel where the transmission is related to the dis-
tance, L, via T = 10−0.02L. When the number of chan-
nel uses N (instances where Alice attempts to generate a
pair of photons and transmit one to Bob) is large and each
party chooses to measure the X(P) observable with proba-
bility pX(1 − pX) the number of observed counts after sift-
ing for a given pump power will be well approximated by
nX,µk = p
2
XpµkκµkN(nP,µk = (1 − pX)2pµkκµkN) where
κµk is the coincidence probability of at least one photon being
detected by both Alice and Bob. It is given by [23],
κµk =
∞∑
n=0
pn|µk(1− (1− pd)(1− ηA)n)
× (1− (1− pd)(1− ηBT )n) (56)
where pd are the dark count probabilities for Alice and Bob’s
detectors and ηA and ηB are their respective efficiencies.
We consider an SPDC source that generates a photon pair
with temporal wave function
|ΨAB〉 =
∫
dtAdtB e
iωP (tA+tB)/2ψ(tA, tB) |tA, tB〉 (57)
where
ψ(tA, tB) =
exp
(
−(tA−tB)2
4σ2cor
− (tA+tB)2
16σ2coh
)
√
2piσcorσcoh
and σcoh and σcor are the pump coherence and photon correla-
tion times respectively. The variance and covariance of Alice
and Bob’s measurement strings will be
VtA = VtB = σ
2
coh +
σ2cor
4
〈tAtB〉 = σ2coh −
σ2cor
4
(58)
One can also write this as a spectral wave function,
ψ(ωA, ωB) =
exp
(−σ2cor(ωA−ωB)2
4 − σ2coh(ωA + ωB)2
)
√
2piσcorσcoh
with spectral variances and correlations,
VωA = VωB =
1
16
(
1
σ2coh
+
4
σ2cor
)
〈ωAωB〉 = −σ
2
cor + 4σ
2
coh
16σ2cohσ
2
cor
(59)
The final calculations necessary to compute the key rate are
the leaked information reconciliation, lEC and the observed
correlations d(pA, pB). The average distance in a typical run
for a given sample size can be found by generating appro-
priately correlated Gaussian distributed strings, binning them
and evaluating (38) directly. For the parameters chosen here,
one finds d(pA, pB) ≈ 0.1. For the sample sizes necessary for
positive key, the amount of information leaked during recon-
ciliation is well approximated by [11, 21],
lEC = nX(H(XA)− βI(XA : XB)) (60)
where H(X) = −∑x∈X p(x) log2 p(x) is the Shannon en-
tropy, I(XA : XB) = H(XA) − H(XA|XB) is the mutual
information and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the reconciliation efficiency.
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Recent advances have demonstrated efficiencies as large as
0.94 [37]. The probabilities for any given outcome can be
found by evaluating the discretised observables in (15) over
the appropriate wavefunction.
In Fig. 1 we plot the secret key rate, l/N , for various val-
ues of the channel uses N , as a function to the transmission
distance. For the parameters chosen here the protocols where
time or frequency are used as the key generating measurement
perform comparably. The time-encoded protocol achieves
positive key over 40 km for N = 109 and out to almost 140
km for N = 1011. It should be noted that there are many
parameters that affect the protocols performance, particularly
the source design and decoy state strategy, and a systematic
optimisation could further improve performance. In particu-
lar, the choice of whether to encode in frequency or time is
strongly dependent upon the properties of the source and de-
tectors. For the parameters used here, encoding in the time ba-
sis results in higher key rates, but for keeping all other param-
eters fixed and decreasing the coherence time to σcoh = 0.3ns
results in virtually identical rates for both protocols.
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FIG. 1: Secret key rate as a function of transmission dis-
tance for protocols where the key is generated from frequency
(dashed) or time (solid) variables. Sample sizes are N =
{109, 1010, 1011} in red, green and blue respectively. Simulation
parameters are: {µ1, µ2, µ3} = {0.2, 0.1, 0.01}, {pµ1 , pµ2 , pµ3} =
{0.7, 0.2, 0.1}, σcoh = 0.5ns, σcor = 20 ps, δt = 60 ps, δω = 5 GHz,
 = 10−10, pd = 6 × 10−7, ηA = ηB = 0.93, β = 0.94 and
pX = 0.5.
A second quantity of interest is the photon information ef-
ficiency (PIE), the number of secret bits extracted per coin-
cident detection. Recall that one of the attractions of these
TFQKD schemes was the promise of a PIE of greater than
one bit per photon. In Fig. 2 we plot the PIE for the same
scenarios as Fig. 1 and observe a value greater that 1 over dis-
tances of 40 km for N = 1010 and 90 km for N = 1011,
showing that the protocol is indeed making use of the higher
dimensions available.
Arguably the most important quantity however, is the
achievable number of secret bits per second. For most proto-
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FIG. 2: Number of secret bits per detected photon as a function of
transmission distance for protocols where the key is generated from
frequency (crosses) or time (dashed) variables. Parameters the same
as Fig. 1.
cols this is simply determined by the rate per channel use and
the practically achievable clock rate of the relevant source.
However, in TFQKD where the key is actually encoded in a
temporal variable itself, the question is more involved. In par-
ticular, recall we earlier noted that for a positive key we had to
ensure the positivity of the statistical fluctuation term C. This
implies the condition
s/21 >
√
(2g(p∆X , nX)) +
√
(2g(p∆P , nX)) (61)
which in turn means that both ∆X and ∆P must be suffi-
ciently large. For the arrival time measurement, the maximum
observable value dictates the time frame for a given round,
Tf = 2∆t and hence a hard upper limit on the possible clock
rate of the protocol of 1Tf .
Using our knowledge of Alice’s source we can calculate
these probabilities for this protocol via Gaussian integration.
For a Gaussian distributed variable of variance VX we have,
p∆X = erf
(
∆X√
2VX
)
(62)
Now for any  > 0 if we require  >
√
(2g(p∆X , nX)) then
substituting and rearranging gives,
∆X =
√
2VXerf
−1
[(
1− 
2
2
)1/nX]
(63)
Applying this to (61), if we choose to make the two terms on
the RHS equal, for the parameters considered here this leads
to a requirement on the frequency detection bandwidth of >
290 GHz or 5 nm at telecom wavelengths. Similarly we have
a requirement on the duration of each round of Tf >11.73 ns
or a maximum clock rate of 85 MHz. In Fig. 3 we plot the
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number of bits per second assuming the system is run at its
maximum clock rate and observe that the system can achieve
rates of over a Mb/s up to a distance of 10-20km depending
upon the sample size. Furthermore, for N = 1011 a key rate
of 100 kb/s is possible up to around 90km.
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FIG. 3: Number of secret bits per second as a function of transmis-
sion distance for protocols where the key is generated from frequency
(dashed) or time (solid) variables. Parameters the same as Fig. 1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a composable security proof for high-
dimensional TFQKD, valid against arbitrary attacks and in-
cluding all finite-size effects. Numerical simulations show
that composably secure TFQKD protocols can indeed extract
greater than 1 secret bit per detected photon resulting in key
rates of over a MB/s at metropolitan distances and maximum
range of well over 100km for sufficiently large sample sizes.
Several avenues for further work remain. Firstly, whilst the
proof here has been for the case where Alice and Bob can di-
rectly make either spectral or temporal measurements, most
concrete proposals for TFQKD involve time-to-frequency
[15] or frequency to time [14] conversion. Provided Alice’s
devices are well characterised it should be straightforward to
determine the appropriate uncertainty relation between these
effectively conjugate measurements. Secondly there is also a
potential weakness to intercept-resend attacks which is par-
ticular to TFQKD protocols due to the combination of an
in-principle unbounded measurement spectrum and coinci-
dence post-selection as first pointed out in [15]. Essentially,
the problem is that if Eve makes an extremely precise non-
destructive measurement of one observable, say arrival time,
this will project onto a state that has limited support within
the finite range of Bob’s frequency detectors. If Alice and
Bob both chose to measure time then Eve will learn this bit
and if they both choose to measure frequency, with high prob-
ability Bob’s detectors will not register the photon and the
round will be discarded, opening a loophole in the security. A
counter-measure based upon a pre-measurement filtering was
proposed in [15] which would need to be rigorously incorpo-
rated into this proof [38]. Finally, a remaining unanswered
question in all security proofs based upon an uncertainty rela-
tion is incorporating an imperfect knowledge of the measure-
ments made by the trusted party. In practice, Alice is not per-
fectly certain of the POVMs that describe her measurements.
A possible solution might incorporate some amount of real
time detector tomography into the security analysis.
We note that the proof presented here could also be used to
rigorously certify the randomness of measurement strings, ex-
tending the work of [39] to explicitly include a failure proba-
bility. This is a particularly attractive possibility since a major
strength of these proposals is the high number of bit/photon
and hence large overall rates at short distances. Note added:
During the writing up of this work the authors became aware
of related results by Niu et al. [40].
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